Interestinthings Law, Startups, Music; maybe in that order

31Aug/100

Google Voice: too good not to fail

"If you wanna to be a phone company, you can't go dead."*

Ok, but then you have to be a phone company. You have to roll out your own physical circuit-switched infrastructure that's managed at every junction. The phone network was evolved slowly over a century with reliability as one of the only concerns (since, as a regulated monopoly, they were only competing with not having a phone). For all its other faults, it delivered that dial tone, pretty much every minute of every day.

What's happening with Skype and Google Voice is that people are beginning to negotiate whether more features and less cost is worth trading in some of the POTS network's legendary reliability. In some ways, it's been an ongoing process since the Great Broadening of cellphone ownership in the 90s. All of a sudden, we could imagine life without a landline, and many of us decided that was the life to live. Now we have a nice handful of options for voice communication, and a metric ton of non-voice options.

One of the most fundamental attributes of the Internet is that things can fail, from the physical layer all the way up to the "business layer," and that has produced not only a staggering pace of innovation, but also an impressive kind of meta-reliability through redundancy. Things don't always work, but there are almost always other ways to do said things. Of course reliability is a feature; often it's one of the most important ones. If we hold out for perfect reliability, though, we will most likely have to wait for Ma Bell 2.0, and there are plenty of reasons we shouldn't want that. Instead, we should recognize all the options we already have; our own personal array of redundant communication channels, suited to our tastes.

*-I recognize the linked post is a couple of years old, but Arrington reiterated the sentiment in a post last week, which is what got me going here.

13May/100

You could call me Francis

I saw Francis and the Lights perform at the Bowery Ballroom a couple of weeks ago (thanks to Arthur) and they just popped up in the shuffle to remind me how great that was. Their live show really is such an incredible performance, but it's a sharp contrast between that and the albums. Many of the funkiest tracks are a bit too funky to be truly heard unperformed, while the slower, more delicate numbers from the new album just seem flat on stage.

While there's some doubters out there, I still want to claim that the new album is great in its own right, even if it has a more structured, populist feel to it. It adds a striking amount of beauty to your day, but that's where it lives; on your iPod, in your ears as you go places. To be clear, I think this is a high and noble purpose for music; it is most of what I like and why I care about music. I spend a lot more time sitting/strolling quietly with headphones than I do freaking out on the dance floor with hundreds of my newest best friends, however much fun the latter is. So It'll Be Better is fantastic headphone music, and that's more than enough reason to check it out at their site (and do creep the back catalog if you haven't).

Also, as if they hadn't already been my new favorite band based on the music alone, they structured themselves as a startup and took an angel investment at a very early stage, which makes them kind of a fascinating experiment.

Filed under: Music, Startups No Comments
7Apr/100

The Curious Case of the $150M Series A

I was reading through the feed for Yokum Taku's excellent Startup Company Lawyer blog, and came across a really interesting post on convertible debt financings with a price cap. Convertible debt is often the easiest way to do a seed/angel stage financing, because it avoids some of the complexity of selling actual equity in your startup; most importantly setting a valuation. Instead of selling shares today, you take the investors' money as debt that can convert into Series A shares, at some discount to that Series A price. So the seed investors punt the valuation decision to the next round and get compensated for their extra risk by getting a lower price when that round comes around. That's why it can be helpful to think about the seed round as a "pre-A" financing (later convertible debt investments between funding rounds that work the same way are called "bridges"). Nevertheless, Yokum says standing alone, they represent a bad deal for the angel investor, which I found a little surprising, because to my knowledge, they have been done like this for quite some time. It may not be standard for every seed deal, but if it were actually crappy, I would expect to barely see it all.

And herein is the issue. Yokum's example to show a poor outcome for the investor presumes a $500K angel investment and then a $50M Series A investment at a pre-money valuation of $100M. This means that the angel will convert into a 0.4% ownership stake in the company. Now obviously that is not what the angel had in mind; if a startup is doing that well, it's supposed to be the home run return that makes up for all their other misses, so they want to have a much bigger piece of the upside. But that's just it: that startup is doing absurdly well, maybe even inconceivably well. It means they've taken $500K (and whatever other assets they had lying around) and created $100M in value.

So is this a crazy story, at least for web startups? It's not news that it's gotten much much cheaper to do a web startup, but I think this level of lean must be mostly accounted for by a self-sustaining growth model, where new users each pay for themselves. Now that kind of model is most simply implemented by actually asking users to pay for your product, but I think the more interesting question is if it can be implemented while still making the user experience free of charge, as most web startups do, and I think the answer may be yes. Working backwards through Yokum's example, if you're worth $100M, you probably have crossed a significant inflection point in your user growth, but you had to somehow get there with a total capital raise of around $500K. That's just not that much cash to burn, and you have to pay your people something, leaving not that much to spend on actual service provision, and even less on capital investments like servers. So you had to be able to scale incrementally, and that means this is really a story about the efficient conversion of incremental cloud-computing resources like Amazon EC2 and some quality incremental monetization methods, such that the resources needed to serve each user can be purchased with the revenue from the ads shown to them (there's certainly other ways to monetize, but ads are a good example because they can theoretically be as incremental as the resources).

Framed this way, the story becomes a lot more plausible to me, and it's an interesting example of how cloud computing may actually have affected the kinds of investment deals that get done, not just who gets funded by those deals. Essentially, the traditional venture chain of multiple funding rounds is getting collapsed in some instances, such that you still need a seed round to start, but you may not need anything more until you need a lot, in order to get truly massive scale. The idea of convertible debt then breaks down, because you can't necessarily expect the next round to happen before the value of the company changes too much, so you can't rely on that round to set your share price. If you want to understand how the addition of a price cap solves this issue, you should really go read Yokum's post.

Filed under: Startups No Comments
5Jan/100

A Startup Exit Calculator

I recently came across a post by Brad Feld pointing to a really great option vesting calculator by Simeon Simeonov, wherein Brad asked at the end for a simplified exit analysis calculator. I was inspired to take some cap tables I had lying around and strip them down a bit in Google Docs, which left me with a (hopefully) pretty good quick-and-dirty tool for looking at potential investment rounds and exits for your startup. I'll get around to making it a form like that option-vesting calculator eventually, but no reason to keep it a secret until then. It's best viewed on the Google Docs site; their embed functionality really isn't what it could be:

Startup Exit Calculator

A few caveats are in order, though:
1. It is just the one spreadsheet shared publicly, so any edits you make will be seen by anyone else looking at it. If secrecy is at all important, download it as an Excel file.
2. For simplicity's sake, I didn't account for anti-dilution protections, so if you put in a down round, the resulting ownership breakdown won't quite reflect what it might be in reality.
3. Finally, and most importantly, IAAL but this is not legal advice. If you actually need some of that, send me an email and we'll talk.

Hope some find this helpful; comments and suggestions always appreciated.

Filed under: Law, Startups No Comments